Students of the legislative process in the United States have long understood the importance of committees, including their vital role in legislation processing and their consequences for the interbranch balance of power (Wilson 1885; Winslow 1931; Fenno 1973; Rosenthal 1974; Basehart 1980; Hamm 1980; Francis and Riddlesperger 1982; Hamm and Moncrief 1982; Ray and Smith 1984; Francis 1985 Francis , 1989 Munger 1988; Hamm and Hedlund 1990 Strahan 1990; Collie and Roberts 1992; Hedlund and Patterson 1992; Reeves 1993; Endersby and McCurdy 1996; Deering and Smith 1997) . Well over a century ago, Woodrow Wilson (1885, 71 ) encapsulated this received wisdom in his aphorism that in Congress, "[w] hatever is to be done must be done by or through the Committees." But recently, scholars have launched a debate on the subtle distinctions of committees' roles in legislative organization. Are committees organized to distribute power among interests (Wilson 1885; McConachie 1898; Fenno 1966 Fenno , 1973 Manley 1970; Mayhew 1974; Price 1978; Shepsle 1978; Davidson 1981; Weingast and Moran 1983; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Hall and Grofman 1990; Shepsle and Weingast 1995; Rundquist, Lee, and Rhee 1996; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Rundquist, et al 1997; Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Adler 2000) or parties (Liebowitz and Tollison 1980; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Hurwitz, Moiles, and Rohde 2001) in American legislatures, or are they organized to provide the parent body with unbiased policy and political information (Krehbiel 1990 (Krehbiel , 1991 Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990 )?
We seek to extend these studies by providing additional evidence from state legislatures, using data from state senates rather than from the lower houses that have been studied in most previous works (Overby and Kazee 2000; Overby, Kazee and Prince 2004; Battista 2004) . 1 Because senates tend to be smaller than lower chambers and to follow the lead of lower chambers that "originate" much legislation, they may have less need of unbiased representative committees to serve as information conduits (Rogers 1998) . We use ratings of state senators in 42 states compiled by a single, federated interest group to show both that outlying committees in state senates are virtually as rare as previous studies have demonstrated them to be in the lower chambers of state legislatures and that there are no predictable patterns to the variation of outlying committees among states. Both of these findings generally bolster the informational model of legislative organization.
Theories of Legislative Organization
Three general theories of legislative organization are most commonly put forward to explain committee purpose and power: the distributive perspective, the party-dominant perspective, and the informational (or chamber-dominant) perspective (for succinct overviews of this debate see Deering and Groseclose and King 2001) . These theories conceive of committees as having very different functions for legislatures and, more generally, legislative organization serving very different purposes.
The distributive theory of legislative organization was for many years the conventional wisdom found in most textbooks on the Congress. This theory conceives of the legislature as a highly decentralized, even atomistic, institution (Hertzke and Peters 1992) with largely autonomous standing committees made up of self-selected members who pursue the preferences of their constituents, while single-mindedly seeking re-election (Wilson 1885; 2 McConachie 1898; Fenno 1966 Fenno , 1973 Manley 1970; Mayhew 1974; Price 1978; Shepsle 1978; Davidson 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Shepsle and Weingast 1995; Rundquist, Lee, and Rhee 1996; Rundquist et al. 1997; Carsey and Rundquist 1999) . According to this perspective, since legislators do not view themselves as engaged in internal, zero-sum games with each other, they regularly logroll amongst themselves and among committees, exchanging deference on policy in which they have little interest for disproportionate influence over policy of major importance to themselves and their constituents. As a result, legislative committees are highly unrepresentative of their parent body, or outlying, since they are composed disproportionately of high demand members. That is, members from rural areas join agriculture committees, members with universities in their districts join higher education committees, and so on. On the other hand, this organization approach does have its benefits, since it encourages gains from trade, the development of policy expertise among legislators, and ---since the parent body defers to its more interested and expert members---the flow of legislation (Shepsle and Weingast 1995; Deering and Smith 1997) .
The information theory of legislative organization conflicts with the distributional model on various levels, both theoretical and empirical. Operating from a principal-agent perspective, and stressing the majoritarian nature of American legislatures, informational theorists note that legislation must eventually receive the imprimatur of the parent body (Krehbiel 1991) . Thus the chamber is the more powerful principal responsible for subordinate agents, the committees. One of the chief implications of this observation is that, in a world of incomplete information, where the implications of legislation are rarely obvious, the principal has a strong incentive to monitor its agents closely (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; Krehbiel 1991) . Since the parent chamber relies on its committees to research and report costly information about the potential impact of legislation, informational theorists conclude that it has a compelling reason to construct committees whose preferences are similar to its own. Thus, this theory posits that the informational needs of the institution trump the electoral needs of individual legislators (or, at least, that members have electoral reasons to worry about the reputation of the institution). In practice, this means that the chamber should try to limit the number of outlying committees so that they are directed toward collective, rather than individual, ends.
Like the informational model, the party-dominant perspective begins with the assumption that committees are agents beholden to a more powerful principal. However, in this case, the principal is the party, particularly the majority party (Liebowitz and Tollison 1980; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993) . Electoral considerations enter into this model only to the extent that legislators believe that their individual electoral fortunes are related to their party's success in the institution. Legislative party leaders capitalize on this belief, using their prerogatives such as committee assignments, control of the agenda, and access to special rules to encourage cooperation among the rank and file (Rohde 1991) . As a result, party delegations on committees will be representative of the delegations in the parent chamber so as "to enhance the collective control of power" of the party (Rohde 1991, 27) .
Efforts to test these competing theories of legislative organization have focused on the frequency of committee outliers in legislatures. That is, how many committees are significantly different in their makeup than the parent chamber (or party delegation in the parent chamber)?
While these attempts have been plagued by numerous methodological conflicts, 3 there is an emerging consensus that committee outliers are the exception rather than the rule, a conclusion that undermines the distributive perspective (Krehbiel 1990 (Krehbiel , 1991 (Krehbiel , 1994 Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; Groseclose 1994; Maltzman 1995; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Overby and Kazee 2000; Overby, Kazee and Prince 2004; Battista 2004) . Indeed, recent studies have often shifted the focus away from counting the relatively few committee outliers to accounting for the conditions under which outliers develop. 4 For example, Maltzman (1995) argues that while important control committees tend to be largely representative of the parent chamber, this is because they contain outlying party delegations on both sides, with liberal Democrats balanced against conservative Republicans.
Senates and State Legislatures
While the debate over legislative organization has often been couched in universalistic On the other hand, we believe there are more compelling reasons related to informational theory to expect that while outliers will be rare in both upper and lower chambers, they might be relatively more common in state senates. The logic here is grounded in the fact that while state senates are, on average, considerably smaller than state houses, they have roughly the same number of committees, which means that state senators are spread more thinly than house members. As a direct result, house members are likely to be better informed than senators, an implication that has been understood at least since 1791 when James Wilson noted in his "Lectures on Law" that "an information more local and minute may be expected in house of representatives, than can be expected in the senates" (see also Story 1833) . 9 Extrapolating to the larger point, it is possible that state senates ---which are informationally overtaxed relative to lower chambers ---are organized less along informational lines than are analogous lower houses and rely heavily on the lower houses for the information needed to pass good laws. While little work has been done to explicate this point in detail, Rogers (1998) has developed a formal model that implies that this is true and presents some limited empirical evidence to support the proposition. 10 In short, if informational needs predominate in considerations of legislative organization, we would expect to see relatively more outliers among state senate committees than among house committees, even if ---in absolute terms ---they are uncommon in both upper and lower chambers.
Data and Methods
To test our hypotheses about legislative organization we examine committee compositions in 42 state senates, replicating as nearly as possible the earlier studies of Overby and Kazee (2000) and Overby, Kazee, and Prince (2004 (Kingdon 1973; Deckard and Stanley 1974; Kritzer 1978; Parker and Parker 1979; Schneider 1979; Abramowitz 1980; Poole and Daniels 1985; Krehbiel 1990; Overby and Kazee 2000; Overby, Kazee and Prince 2004) .
Additionally, ideology has been found to account for about 80% of the variance in interest group scores (Kritzer 1978; Poole 1981; Poole and Daniels 1985) . While these scores are often based on a small number of legislative votes, interest groups carefully select these votes resulting in ratings that represent real policy differences among legislators (Krehbiel 1990) . In a recent comparative study, Burden, Caldeira, and Groseclose (2000, 250) concluded that "roll-call based measures operationalize legislator ideology at least as well as alternative measures do."
Eight states are excluded from our analysis for various reasons. Maine and Connecticut use joint committees that complicate calculating committee-chamber comparisons. 13 Nebraska has a unique unicameral, non-partisan legislature rendering it distinct from the other states. The NFIB has not posted ratings for members of the New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina senates. In Hawaii, the NFIB publishes only a listing of the "Friends of Small
Business," which renders data from that senate incommensurate with that from the others.
Finally, the lack of variation in the NFIB scores for Massachusetts state senators made them useless for analytical purposes.
[ 16 We then computed a mean NFIB score of the members selected for each simulated committee creating an estimated density of the mean for that committee in each chamber if committee members had been selected at random, that is, if members were not a biased sample of the chamber. We count as an outlier any committee whose actual mean NFIB score is more than two standard deviations away from the overall mean of its simulated committees. We conducted similar Monte Carlo simulations to determine if the Democratic and Republican delegations on each committee were representative of the respective party caucus or if the committee delegations were composed of party outliers.
We identified senators' committee assignments from the State Yellow Book. 17 Our decision to use means, rather than medians, as a measure of the central tendency of legislative preference is based on earlier works on state legislative lower chambers. Overby and Kazee (2000) give a number of methodological and substantive reasons for preferring means, including their greater transparency, greater sensitivity to outliers, greater resistance to measurement error, and more accurate reflection of the real world importance of the intensity of preferences.
Furthermore, the validity of a comparison of medians is based on an assumption of the strict unidimensionality of preferences (Aldrich and Battista 2002; Hinich 1977) which cannot be guaranteed among legislators.
18
Findings Table 2 shows the percentage of senate committees in each state that were outliers compared to their parent chamber. These findings are broadly similar to those reported by Overby and Kazee (2000) , Prince (2004), and Battista (2004) . Outlying committees are rare in state senates, although not as rare as in the lower chambers, a finding that is consistent with our bicameral hypothesis. Among the control committees that structure the rules, appropriations, and taxation policies in state senates, we find that only 7.5 percent were preference outliers (four outliers in 53 control committees). More telling, of the 33 states in our sample for which we have data on control committees, fully 29 (87.9 percent) had no outlying control committees. Of non-control committees, outliers were somewhat more common, representing 11.3 percent of the total, a finding similar to Krehbiel's (1991) political, and institutional factors that might be expected to influence the representativeness of committees, including region (as a surrogate for political culture), legislative professionalism, party control of the chamber, locus of power within the chamber, minority party input into the committee composition, effective number of parties in the chamber, and (in the equation for noncontrol committee outliers) the number of non-control committees in the chamber.
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As the findings summarized in Table 3 show, the relative frequency of committee preference outliers in state senates appears to be largely idiosyncratic, results that closely match those for state lower houses (Overby, Kazee, and Prince 2004, Table 4 ). None of the independent variables in these models even approaches statistical significance, a fact underscored by the negative adjusted-R 2 generated by each equation. This absence of pattern in the prevalence of committee outliers provides further support for the informational model of legislative organization. In state senates, as in state houses and in the United States House, representative committees are ubiquitous. Outliers are not only uncommon, but they develop peculiar to individual circumstances and are unaffected by a range of political and institutional factors.
[ Table 3 about here]
Conclusions
We have attempted to generalize tests of models of legislative organization that were originally developed in and, until recently, had been tested only in the United States House of Table 2 shows that across all types of committees and across nearly all of the 42 states in our sample, preference outlying committees are rare in state senates, accounting for only 7.5 percent of control committees and 11.3 percent of non-control committees. Moreover, none of a variety of relevant cultural, political, and institutional factors helps explain the pattern to the variation in committee outliers among the states. Taken with previous findings our results provide robust support for the proposition that the informational model of legislative organization is generalizable beyond the United States House of Representatives. In both chambers of state legislatures, committees tend to be composed so as to make them broadly representative of their parent chamber, increasing the likelihood that they will faithfully perform their duties as agents of the chamber relaying valuable information accurately to these principals.
Note that we find two nuances of interest in the committee composition of state legislatures. First, there are relatively more outliers in state senates than in state lower chambers.
This fits well with our bicameral hypothesis that expects less of an information-gathering role from members of upper as compared to lower chambers (Rogers 1998) . While the differences are not great, 22 they support the notion that information matters more in lower chambers, suggesting that informationally overtaxed senators tend to rely on their better informed colleagues in the house for policy information.
Second, we uncovered more evidence among committee party delegations than among committees as a whole, although in most categories, less than a third of committee party delegations were outliers. Compared to earlier work on state lower chambers (Overby and Kazee 2000; Overby, Kazee, and Prince 2004) , we found more evidence of party stacking along ideological lines uncovered by Maltzman (1995) Together with similar studies of lower chambers of Congress (Krehbiel 1990 (Krehbiel , 1991 Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; Groseclose 1994; Maltzman 1995; Poole and Rosenthal 1997) 2 Although much of Wilson's thinking on this matter pre-saged the distributive perspective, he also understood that committees served an informational function: "A Committee is commissioned, not to instruct the public, but to instruct and guide the House" (Wilson 1885, 71) .
3 These methodological disputes have included questions of the proper measure of legislative preference (Krehbiel [1990 (Krehbiel [ , 1994 and others have used interest group ratings, while others have argued that such ratings are too broad, artificially extreme, or subject to the distorting effects of deference and, therefore, favored the use of either constituency-based measures or scaled algorithms such as NOMINATE scores [Snyder 1992; Hall and Grofman 1990; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Herron 1999] ); the appropriateness of means (and t tests) versus medians (and Monte Carlo simulations) as measures of central tendency (Groseclose 1994) ; different measurement models (Londregan and Snyder 1992) ; and even the need to use inferential statistics at all (Brown et al. 1997) . 4 For instance, even Adler and Lapinski (1997, 899) , who believe outliers are relatively common in Congress, acknowledge that they are most likely to be found among "private good committees" (e.g., Agriculture, Interior and Insular Affairs) rather than control committees (e.g., Rules, Appropriations, Ways and Means) whose behavior is closely monitored by the floor and the majority party.
congressional caucuses by Ainsworth and Akins (1997) , and House Appropriations subcommittees by Adler (2000) . 7 These findings have also been supported by Battista (2004) who devised NOMINATE-like scores for 11 state legislative chambers. He found outliers to account for only between four and five percent of all committees in his sample, and for them to be common in only one of the chambers he investigated (the Rhode Island House).
Conference on Civil Rights uses 11 votes, the AFL-CIO uses 10, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees uses nine). The range varied from Wyoming, whose NFIB used three votes, to Colorado, whose NFIB used 25. While the low numbers used by some NFIB affiliates may raise validity or reliability concerns, a much larger group of state NFIB offices used more than 10 votes. NFIB affiliates also differed marginally in how they treated missing data, but in general they excluded only members who did not participate in a majority of the votes used to tabulate the ratings; this resulted in an average of .8 omitted cases per state with the maximum of 4 missing cases occurring once in Illinois. 13 The Maine Senate has four standing committees of its own, but these perform entirely organizational functions and do not have jurisdiction over substantive legislation. In a separate analysis not reported here, we found these four committees and the party delegations that comprise them to be non-outliers.
arbitrarily small distance from the main one, the median voter theory collapses in the absence of a median in all directions, which is highly unlikely. Further, Hinich (1977) proves that the median voter results is also highly dependent on a total lack of uncertainty in the process."
19 A complete list of outlying committees by state, noting the direction of the bias, is available from the authors.
20 A complete list of outlying party delegation by state, noting the direction of the bias, is available from the authors. 21 For each of these variables, the coding schemes and hypotheses are described in Overby, Kazee, and Prince (2004) . 22 Difference of means tests comparing percentages of outlying committees in upper and lower chambers show no statistically significant difference among control committees (t = 0.66), but that the percentage of outliers among non-control committees is significantly higher in state senates (t = 3.37). Notes: Committee outlier percentages are based on 1000 Monte Carlo simulations that compare the actual committee's mean NFIB rating to 1000 randomly generated potential committee compositions. Control committees are committees whose names indicated they were responsible for tax bills, appropriations choices, or the rules of the chamber. Non-control committees are all other committees. 
